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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
1.

The plaintiff-appellee is Key Bank National Association, referred to herein

as "Key Bank."
2.

The defendant-appellant is Wayne R. Weston, referred to herein as "Mr.

Weston."
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) and §78-A-4-103(2)(j), and the Order
from the Utah Supreme Court dated July 10, 2008, this Court has jurisdiction over this
appeal from the Order and Judgment entered by the district court on or about May 6,
2008.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Key Bank offers the following statement of issues in lieu of that contained on page
one of the Brief of Appellant:
ISSUE NO. 1:

Whether the district court correctly ruled that Mr. Weston

personally contracted with Key Bank when he opened a Prefened Credit Line from Key
Bank, thereafter borrowed money made available to him by Key Bank pursuant to the
terms of the Preferred Credit Line Agreement and thereafter refused to repay the money
he borrowed.
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the district court correctly ruled that Mr. Weston was
personally obligated to repay the Preferred Credit Line debt pursuant to the January 21,
2000 Commercial Guaranty.
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether the district court correctly denied Mr. Weston's Motion
to Strike the Affidavit of Helen M. Rozich.
ISSUE NO. 4: Whether the district court correctly awarded attorney's fees and
costs to Key Bank following the court's grant of summary judgment to Key Bank.
Mr. Weston appeals from a summary judgment. Key Bank is satisfied with Mr.
Weston's recitation of the applicable standard of review for each of the foregoing issues.
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises from Mr. Weston's refusal to repay money that he borrowed from
Key Bank pursuant to a Preferred Credit Line.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Factual History
Early in 2000, Mr. Weston contacted Key Bank by telephone and applied for a
Preferred Credit Line. R. 209-212 (Weston Depo. 174:18-22; 178:15-22; 187:1-3). Mr.
Weston owns and operates a small used car business called May Corporation d/b/a
Autocraft. R. 226 (Weston Depo. 42:1 - 44:17). On or about January 21, 2000, Mr.
Weston executed a Commercial Guaranty, in which he personally guaranteed all existing
and future indebtedness of May Corporation to Key Bank. R. 181, R. 172-74.
The Preferred Credit Line was a loan product offered by Key Bank solely and
exclusively to individuals. R. 181, 165-70. The Preferred Credit Line was never offered
to businesses or organizations. Id. Key Bank never extended a Preferred Credit Line to a
business.

R. 181.

In order to provide greater flexibility and convenience to its

borrowers, Key Bank accepted applications for Preferred Credit Lines over the telephone
and without a signed contract. R. 180. In lieu of a signed contract, Key Bank provided
borrowers with a Preferred Credit Line Agreement, which clearly stated that use of the
Preferred Credit Line constitutes acceptance of the terms of the Preferred Credit Line
Agreement. R. 180, 189-90.
To obtain the Preferred Credit Line, Mr. Weston contacted Key Bank via
telephone and provided the bank with personal financial information such as social
2

security number, home address, and employment history.

R. 180.

Based upon his

telephone application and the information provided, Mr. Weston was granted a personal
Preferred Credit Line with a credit limit of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00). R. 181,
95-164, R. 209-213 (Weston Depo. 169: 23 - 174: 22; 178:15-22; 187:1-3).
The Preferred Credit Line was opened exclusively in the name of Wayne Weston.
R. 155-163, R. 211 (Weston Depo. \11\\4-\1

"I acknowledge that a preferred line of

credit was sent to me in the name of Wayne Weston."; 177:24 - 178-21). After opening
the Preferred Credit Line, Key Bank mailed Mr. Weston a book of checks and a copy of
the Preferred Credit Line Agreement to the home address Mr. Weston had provided. R.
180, 212 (Weston Depo. 173:12-13). The Preferred Credit Line Agreement expressly
stated that by opening the Preferred Credit Line, the borrower [Mr. Weston] accepted the
terms and conditions of the Preferred Credit Line Agreement and assumed responsibility
to repay all credit extended pursuant to the Preferred Credit Line. R. 189-90. The
Preferred Credit Line Agreement also stated that subject to the terms of the Agreement,
Key Bank would make advances from time to time at the request of the borrower, which
advances could be requested at any branch location or by negotiating the convenience
checks mailed with the Agreement. Id.

Q. When you negotiated and obtained the preferred line of credit, it undisputedly
came in the name of Wayne Weston?
A. That's correct.
(Emphasis added).
3

The book of convenience checks mailed to Mr. Weston along with the Preferred
Credit Line Agreement bore only the name of Wayne Weston in the payor section. R.
179, 1ST9 212 (Weston Depo. 173:1-13; 178:3-14).
Below Mr. Weston's name appeared his home address of 303 West 100 North,
Provo, Utah, as he had represented it to Key Bank.

Id.

The checks contained no

reference whatsoever to May Corporation or any other business entity. Id. Mr. Weston
admitted that he received the book of convenience checks based upon his negotiation
with Key Bank for a loan to Wayne Weston. R. 210-212 (Weston Depo. 173:14-17).
Despite receiving the checks which bore only his personal name, Mr. Weston admitted
that he never contacted Key Bank to verify whether the Preferred Credit Line was opened
under the name of May Corporation. R. 212 (Weston Depo. 174:18 - 176:4).

9

Mr. Weston argues on appeal, as he did in the proceeding below, that this address was
not in fact, his home address. However, in Mr. Weston's deposition, he admitted that this
was his home address in an unsolicited response.
Q. - a book of blank checks?
A. Yeah.
Q. And in the top left corner would have been your name?
A. Yes. Not my full name, just my name, Wayne Weston.
Q. Not anything else?
A. Well, the address.
Q. And your address, okay.
A. The home address.
R. 212 (Weston Depo. 173: 4-13) (Emphasis added). Furthermore, Mr. Weston never
denied having provided the address at issue to Key Bank and representing that it was, at
that time, his home address. Mr. Weston's deposition testimony changed frequently and
he often contradicted himself to offer whatever testimony he felt best benefited him at the
time of his response.
4

Mr. Weston admitted that he knew the difference between company and personal
checks as company checks always bear the name and address of the company whereas
personal checks bear only the name and address of the individual payor(s). R. 211,
(Weston Depo. 179:6 - 180:5). Despite this knowledge, Mr. Weston also admitted that he
never contacted Key Bank to have the checks or the Preferred Credit Line modified to
reflect or at least include any reference whatsoever to May Corporation. R. 211-213.
Mr. Weston drew advances from the Preferred Credit Line and negotiated the
convenience checks under his personal name only. Id., see also R. 93, 187; R. 205, 209
(Weston Depo. 185:16-18; 201:3 - 202:4). Mr. Weston baldly offered that he entered into
the Preferred Credit Line and took advances against the credit line with the dubious and
alleged unilateral "intent" to act on behalf of May Corporation.3 However, the record

Q. Did you ever contact Key Bank to find out why they sent you this book of
checks?
A. No. Because we had negotiated for a loan which was a result of conversation,
and the money went into the corporation, which is Wayne Weston.
Q. Let's unpack that a little bit. When you say "we negotiated a loan," who's we?
A. We as the bank.
Q. And you, Wayne Weston.
A. Wayne Weston as secretary/treasurer of May Corporation.
Q. Did you indicate you were Wayne Weston calling on behalf of May Corp. as
the secretary and treasurer and that May Corp. would like to get a loan from the bank?
A. The financial statements that 1 sent on the top say May Corporation.
Q. That's not the question. The question is, the checks that you received from
Key Bank - A. Okay. They don't say anything about May Corporation on it, but there's an
5

makes clear that Mr. Weston's doubtful "intent" was never communicated to Key Bank.
Indeed, the only arguable communication of this purported "intent" to bind only May
Corporation did not reach Key Bank until after all funds were advanced and after the
commencement of Key Bank's lawsuit. R. 212. Further, Mr. Weston presented no
evidence whatsoever that would demonstrate that his alleged "intent" to bind May
Corporation and not Mr. Weston was ever the subject of any mutual assent.
Mr. Weston admitted that he took advances on his Preferred Credit Line by
negotiating several of the convenience checks sent to him and that in doing so; he signed
only his personal name. Id., see also R. 93, 187; R. 205, 209 (Weston Depo. 185:16-18;
201:3 - 202:4). Key Bank's records also conclusively demonstrated that Mr. Weston also
took advantage of visiting a Key Bank branch location and having a bank counter check
drawn and made payable into a joint checking account held by Mr. Weston and his wife.
Id.

In each and every instance where Mr. Weston obtained an advance against his

Preferred Credit Line by way of a check, he executed and negotiated the checks
personally and by signing only "Wayne Weston" or "Wayne R. Weston." Id. During his
deposition, Mr. Weston went so far as to argue that he acted in a corporate capacity when
he signed checks as Wayne Weston and personally when he signed as Wayne "R"
Weston. R. 204 (Weston Depo. 207:1 - 18). It is undisputed that Mr. Weston did not
negotiate either the convenience checks or the counter check in the name of May

intent.
R. 212 (Weston Depo. 174: 18-25; 175:1-9; 176:1-4) (Emphasis added).
6

Corporation or with any designation/distinction of his official capacity with May
Corporation. Id.
Key Bank issued all invoices on the Preferred Credit Line in the name of Wayne
Weston with no reference whatsoever to May Corporation. R. 180, 95-163. The invoices
were mailed each month to the address Mr. Weston had provided to Key Bank as being
his home address. R. 179. Years later and after being advanced nearly all of the money
available under the Preferred Credit Line, Mr. Weston or someone acting on his behalf
contacted Key Bank and requested that they change the invoices to be addressed "Wayne
Weston c/o May Corporation." R. 178; see also R. 210 {Weston Depo. 181:3 - 182:2).
Regarding funds advanced by Key Bank pursuant to the Preferred Credit Line, Mr.
Weston admitted that the advanced funds were never paid directly by Key Bank to May
Corporation and were never made available by Key Bank directly to May Corporation.
R. 209 (Weston Depo. 185:16 - 187: 3). In each instance where money advanced to Mr.
Weston from the Preferred Credit Line ended up in a May Corporation account, Mr.
Weston independently acted as a necessary intermediary to transfer the money from his
personal Preferred Credit Line account and into a separate May Corporation business
checking account. R. 93, 188.
Mr. Weston admitted that he used his personal money to fund his business and that
he used money from the Preferred Credit Line to fund his business. R. 221 (Weston
Depo. 139:25 - 140:12); R. 193-96.

Specifically, Mr. Weston admitted that he

sometimes deposited his money into May Corporation's business account in order to
satisfy May Corporation's corporate debts.
7

Id.

One example of this practice was

illustrated to the district court by convenience check No. 10015 where Mr. Weston took
an advance on his Preferred Credit Line to infuse ten thousand dollars into Autocraft, a
d/b/a of May Corporation. R. 187, 205 (Weston Depo, 201:1 - 202:6, 205:6-18).
The undisputed evidence also clearly revealed that Mr. Weston took advances on
his personal Preferred Credit Line for non-business related reasons. In April of 2004, Mr.
Weston personally negotiated and endorsed a convenience check drawn on the Preferred
Line of Credit in the amount of four thousand five hundred dollars, which amount was
roughly all that remained available on his thirty-thousand dollar Preferred Credit Line.
R. 179, 93, 203-04 (Weston Depo. 208:2 - 210:16). Mr. Weston deposited that check
into a different checking account owned jointly by Mr. Weston and his wife. Id. While
Mr. Weston's often self-contradictory deposition testimony attempted to refute this fact,
the undisputed business records and invoices from both the Preferred Credit Line and Mr.
Weston's Zion's bank account undisputedly evidence that this money was paid from the
Preferred Credit Line into Mr. Weston's personal joint checking account. Id.
Shortly after being advanced the last bit of available credit, Mr. Weston or
someone acting on his behalf contacted Key Bank and requested that Key Bank modify
the invoices to add "c/o May Corporation" under Mr. Weston's name. R. 178. In order
to ensure proper mailing, Key Bank honored Mr. Weston's request to modify the invoices
but that action did not nullify Mr. Weston's personal indebtedness to Key Bank pursuant
to the Preferred Credit Line. Id. Shortly after the invoices were modified, Mr. Weston
ceased making payment on the Preferred Credit Line and then defaulted on the credit
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line. Id. Mr. Weston did not contest that the default sum was $28,078.44 as of December
13, 2006, with interest thereon at the statutory rate.
2. Procedural HistoryKey Bank strongly objects to that portion of Mr. Weston's Statement of the Case
which purports to objectively depict the disposition of the district court on Key Bank's
Motion for Summary Judgment and Mr. Weston's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of
Helen M. Rozich. Mr. Weston's account mischaracterizes the district court's actions
below. Further, Mr. Weston's account provides an incomplete explanation of the district
court's analysis and the reasoning behind its decisions in this case.
Based upon evidence produced during discovery, Key Bank motioned the district
court for summary judgment on or about February 5, 2008. R. 186. In support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment, Key Bank filed a Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and the Affidavit of Helen M.
Rozich. R. 259 and 182 respectively. Attached as exhibits to Key Bank's Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment was the full
deposition transcript of Mr. Weston (R. 239), Mr. Weston's Answer to Key Bank's First
Set of Interrogatories, Request for Admissions and Request for Production of Documents
(R. 196), the Preferred Credit Line Agreement (R. 190), and a copy of convenience check
No. 1001 (R. 187). The January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty, Preferred Credit Line
information sheet, all invoices regarding Mr. Weston's Preferred Credit Line and a copy
of Key Bank counter check No. 594639702 (from which Mr. Weston advanced roughly
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the last four thousand five hundred dollars from his Preferred Credit Line before
defaulting on the same) were attached as exhibits to the Affidavit of Ms. Rozich.
Key Bank motioned for summary judgment on several grounds. R. 184-186. Key
Bank's first argument was that the undisputed facts of the case established that Mr.
Weston contracted with Key Bank for the Preferred Credit Line and that Mr. Weston had
breached that contract by refusing to repay the amount borrowed pursuant to the
Preferred Credit Line. Id. The Second argument was that Mr. Weston was liable to Key
Bank on Key Bank's alternative claim of quantum meruit in the event the district court
did not conclude that an enforceable express contract was created. Id. Finally, Key Bank
argued that even if the district court agreed with Mr. Weston that the debt owed on the
Preferred Credit Line was a May Corporation obligation, Mr. Weston was still personally
obligated to repay the debt by virtue of the January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty. Id.
Key Bank argued that it was entitled to an award of attorney's fees on three separate
grounds: first, the Preferred Credit Line Agreement; second, the Commercial Guaranty;
and third, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 for Mr. Weston's bad-faith conduct.
R. 243.
In his Memorandum in Opposition to Key Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Mr. Weston denied personal liability on the Preferred Credit Line despite his undisputed
personal use of the Preferred Credit Line and personal advances thereon. As his defense
to Key Bank's claim of personal liability, Mr. Weston further argued that the extension of
the Preferred Credit Line undisputedly formed a contract between May Corporation and
Key Bank. R. 301. Specifically, Mr. Weston argued and admitted that, "Defendant [Mr.
10

Weston] does not deny the existence of an express contract between Plaintiff [Key Bank]
and May Corporation." Id.
After arguing that the Preferred Credit Line was clearly May Corporation's
corporate liability, Mr. Weston sought to distance himself from the inevitable personal
liability which would result from May Corporation's default in repaying the Preferred
Credit Line pursuant to the January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty. Mr. Weston baldly
asserted that the January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty had been abrogated in a
subsequent settlement between Key Bank and Mr. Weston.

R. 295. However, Mr.

Weston offered no evidence that even remotely supported his contention of abrogation
and settlement. R. 295-96. Mr. Weston offered only unsigned settlement documents
pertaining to a wholly separate and unrelated transaction and set of commercial
guaranties. R. 299-300. Mr. Weston's abrogation argument was flatly rejected by the
district court as evidenced by the district court's disposition and ruling.

R. 399-401;

First Supp. Index, p. 461, Hrg. Tran. P. 21.
The only argument Mr. Weston raised in his brief with respect to attorney's fees,
was that there was no "bad faith" and therefore no entitlement to an award of attorney's
fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. R. 297. Mr. Weston did not dispute that
attorney's fees were recoverable in the event that Key Bank prevailed on its claim under
either the Preferred Credit Line Agreement or the January 21, 2000 Commercial
Guaranty. Id.
Mr. Weston also opposed Key Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment by filing a
separate Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Helen M. Rozich on the grounds that the
11

Affidavit lacked foundation and contained inadmissible hearsay. R. 315, 320. In making
his argument, Mr. Weston incorrectly alleged that Ms. Rozich did not identify or produce
the documents upon which her affidavit was based. R. 315. In its Memorandum in
Opposition to Mr. Weston's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Ms. Rozich, Key Bank
explained that the documents relied upon by Ms. Rozich were documents kept by Key
Bank in the ordinary course of business and were previously produced to Mr. Weston on
two separate occasions during discovery. R. 348-350. Furthermore, the majority of the
documents she relied upon were in fact, attached as exhibits to her Affidavit. Id.
On March 31, 2008, the district court entertained argument on Key Bank's Motion
for Summary Judgment and Mr. Weston's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Helen M.
Rozich. R. 359. The district court granted Key Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment
and denied Mr. Weston's Motion to Strike from the bench. Id. The transcript from
hearing shows that the district court found that, "Mr. Weston personally took advantage
of that line of credit [the Preferred Credit Line], obtained the funds." First Supp. Index,
p. 461, Hrg. Iran. P. 25. "The money was used by him [Mr. Weston], was deposited into
his own banking account, and is due and owing and payable to Key Bank; and their
motion for summary judgment is well taken." Id. "Even though the checks show what
Mr. Dalton argues is a corporate address, everything else demonstrates personal use." Id.
"The address issue that has been raised is not sufficient for me to find that it's a corporate
obligation rather than a personal obligation for which Mr. Weston is responsible." First
Supp. Index, p. 461, Hrg. Tran. P. 26. "I do not find that there are genuine issues of
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material fact nor iss- - (sic) nor questions of law that would defeat the motion that has
been filed." Id.
Following the hearing, Key Bank submitted to Mr. Weston a proposed Order and
Judgment in conformity with what Key Bank understood from the district court's bench
ruling. Mr. Weston objected to the proposed Order and Judgment on the grounds that he
did not recall the district court ruling on Mr. Weston's hearsay objection to the Rozich
Affidavit. R. 371. Mr. Weston also objected to the proposed Order and Judgment by
arguing that there was no basis in the district court's ruling for an award of attorney's
fees and costs to Key Bank. Id.
In his Objection to the proposed Order and Judgment, Mr. Weston impermissibly
offered new argument not raised in his previous briefing or argument. Id. Specifically,
Mr. Weston argued for the first time in his Objection that he had never received the
Preferred Credit Line Agreement. Mr. Weston went so far as to allege that Key Bank
actually conceded that the Preferred Credit Line Agreement was never delivered to Mr.
Weston. Id. Key Bank made no such concession and Key Bank's briefing and the
Affidavit of Helen M. Rozich squarely and overtly contradict this assertion. R. 255; R.
211-213; 392-93. In a particularly underhanded move, Mr. Weston also directed the
district court to a portion of his deposition transcript that had nothing to do with the
Preferred Credit Line Agreement, but which Mr. Weston referenced in order to make it
appear as if the Preferred Credit Line Agreement was internal to Key Bank and never
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sent to Mr. Weston.4 In his Brief, Mr. Weston has attempted to perpetrate the same ruse
on this Court. Brief of Appellant, p. 17.
In its bench ruling, the Court did not expressly mention Key Bank's claim on the
Commercial Guaranty. Id. That does not mean, however, that "Key Bank's claim on the
Commercial Guaranty formed no part of the trial court's ruling" as represented by Mr.
Weston in his appellate Brief. Brief of Appellant, p. 15. In fact, the opposite is true. In
its Ruling which followed the filing of Mr. Weston's Objection to Key Bank's proposed
Order and Judgment, the district court specifically addressed the Commercial Guaranty
based claim and confirmed that Key Bank was entitled to its claim against Mr. Weston on
this alternative ground.

R. 399-400.

The district court stated, "there were three

Commercial Guaranties involved in this action, two of which were abrogated. The final

4

The Deposition Exhibit No. 3 referenced in Mr. Weston's deposition transcript is, in
fact, Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Helen M. Rozich and is an internal Key Bank
document designed to assist its employees explain the function and utility of the
Preferred Credit Line offered by Key Bank. This internal document specifically states
that Preferred Credit Lines are only offered to individuals as an unsecured personal line
of credit. This document is not the Preferred Credit Line Agreement that Key Bank
sends to all customers together with the convenience checks upon the opening of a
Preferred Credit Line. Furthermore, the record clearly shows that this internal Key Bank
informational statement was not attached in any form to Key Bank's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. To the contrary, the
record clearly shows that Exhibit "B" to Key Bank's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Summary Judgment was the actual Preferred Credit Line
Agreement, which was undisputedly mailed to Mr. Weston together with the convenience
checks that he admittedly used in order to take advances against his Preferred Credit
Line. In his deposition, Mr. Weston stated that he had never seen the internal Key Bank
document, which described the Preferred Credit Line, not that he had not received the
Preferred Credit Line Agreement. Ms. Rozich averred that the Preferred Credit Line
Agreement was sent together with the convenience checks. R. 255; 392-93. Mr. Weston
never disputed that he received the Preferred Credit Line Agreement and he cannot do so
now.
14

one remains in force. It required attorney's fees as well; therefore, [Mr. Weston] is liable
for reasonable attorney's fees as he contracted to be in both agreements." R. 399; see
also R. 393. In short, by way of its clarifying Ruling, the district court informed Mr.
Weston that the court did not buy into the argument that the January 21, 2000
Commercial Guaranty was ever abrogated. In light of the briefing, argument, and the
Court's subsequent Ruling, Mr. Weston's current allegation that "the trial court
(evidently) hung its ruling on one of the Commercial Guaranties given by May
Corporation or Weston's Wife" has absolutely no basis whatsoever.

See Brief of

Appellant, p. 18. Mr. Weston makes this allegation solely to obfuscate the simple and
incontrovertible fact that the lower court held that the January 21, 2000 Commercial
Guaranty remained in force against Mr. Weston as was briefed and argued by Key Bank.
Based upon the foregoing, on or about May 6, 2008, the district court entered its
Order and Judgment from which Mr. Weston takes his immediate appeal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court's summary judgment in favor of Key Bank should be affirmed
because the district court correctly held that the material facts were undisputed and
sufficiently evidenced that Mr. Weston was personally obligated on the Preferred Credit
Line as a matter of law. The district court correctly found that Mr. Weston "personally
took advantage of the line of credit [and] obtained the funds."' The district court also
correctly held that none of Mr. Weston's arguments was sufficient to create any genuine
issue of material fact and preclude summary judgment.

15

The issues of whether Mr.

Weston provided Key Bank with his home or business address and whether Key Bank
possessed Mr. Weston's social security number did not create any issues of material fact.
The district court's summary judgment in favor of Key Bank should be also
affirmed because the district court correctly held that Mr. Weston failed to provide any
evidence that the January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty had been abrogated. Under the
January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty, Mr. Weston is obligated to repay all sums
advanced under the Preferred Credit Line, even assuming arguendo that the sums were
advanced to May Corporation. Even on appeal, Mr. Weston continues to aver that the
evidence undisputedly shows that the Preferred Credit Line was opened in the name of
May Corporation. ("THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE PREFERRED LINE OF
CREDIT WAS OPENED IN THE NAME OF MAY CORPORATION, NOT WESTON"
Brief of Appellant, p. 20 (Emphasis in original). Accepting Mr. Weston's admission and
affirmative representation that the Preferred Credit Line was an express contract between
Key Bank and May Corporation, Mr. Weston is undisputedly obligated to repay the
Preferred Credit Line debt based upon the January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty, which
the facts conclusively demonstrate was never abrogated.
The district court's denial of Mr. Weston's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Helen
M. Rozich should also be affirmed because the district court correctly held that the
subject affidavit contained sufficient foundation and fell within the admissibility
requirement of Utah R. Evid. 803(6).
The district court's award of attorney's fees and costs should be affirmed because
the district court correctly held that an award of attorney's fees and costs was warranted
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by operation of the Preferred Credit Line Agreement and the January 21, 2000
Commercial Guaranty.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE MR.
WESTION IS PERSONALLY OBLIGATED TO REPAY THE ADVANCES
HE PERSONALLY RECEIVED FROM HIS PREFERRED CREDIT LINE
WITH KEY BANK.
The district court properly granted summary judgment in Key Bank's favor

because Mr. Weston personally took advantage of the Preferred Credit Line by taking
advances against the credit line personally. The Brief of Appellant misrepresents the
status of the undisputed evidence at issue. The undisputed facts are that: 1) Mr. Weston
admitted that he solicited the Preferred Credit Line from Key Bank, 2) Mr. Weston
received a book of convenience checks, which bore only the name of "Wayne Weston"
and below which appeared the street address that Mr. Weston represented to Key Bank to
be his home address, 3) Mr. Weston never disputed receiving the Preferred Credit Line
Agreement which accompanied the checks, 4) Mr. Weston negotiated all of the
convenience checks and counter checks personally and without any designation or
reference whatsoever that he intended to act in any corporate capacity for May
Corporation, 5) Mr. Weston deposited certain of the advanced funds into a personal
checking account held by Mr. Weston and his wife, 6) Mr. Weston advanced funds from
the Preferred Credit Line were never paid directly by Key Bank to May Corporation or
made available by Key Bank to May Corporation and in each instance Mr. Weston acted
as the necessary intermediary to transfer money out of his Preferred Credit Line and into
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the separate and distinct May Corporation account, and 7) Mr. Weston received all
invoices on the Preferred Credit Line at his home address and without any reference to
May Corporation until after Mr. Weston had advanced nearly all funds made available
through the Preferred Credit Line. These undisputed facts alone formed a sufficient basis
for the district court to hold Mr. Weston personally liable for the sums advanced pursuant
to the Preferred Credit Line Agreement.
Mr. Weston repeatedly alleges in his appellate brief that he only acted on behalf of
May Corporation when he took advances against the Preferred Credit Line. However,
there is absolutely no evidence or testimony to support this allegation. Mr. Weston's
occasional deposition references to his unilateral, silent and covert intention to limit his
personal liability and bind only May Corporation on the Preferred Credit Line are
insufficient as a matter of law. Mr. Weston's dubious intention was clearly hidden from
Key Bank. Mr. Weston never expressly manifested his purported intent and there is
absolutely no evidence of mutual assent on the part of Key Bank. Mr. Weston's secret
understanding and intent of acting as an officer for the corporation is not legally
sufficient to avoid liability as a matter of law.
Utah law is overwhelmingly clear that a corporate officer who fails to clearly
signify his corporate capacity will be held personally liable. "To relieve an individual
signer from liability, the signer's corporate capacity must be clear from the form of the
signature." DBL Distributing, Inc., v. / Cache, LLC,

2006 UT App 400, f 13, 147 P.3d

478, 481; citing Boise Cascade Corp. v. Stonewood Dev. Corp., 655 P.2d 668, 668 n.l
(Utah 1982) (per curiam) ("[WJhere it is not clear that a corporate officer signs a contract
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in a representative capacity, he is personally liable."). "Individuals who fail to limit their
signatures to their corporate capacity have consistently been held to be directly liable on
corporate instruments" DBL Distributing, 2006 UT App at ^f 13; citing Bushnell Real
Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746, 751-52 (Utah 1983) (holding corporate officers
liable on promissory note where they failed to signify their corporate capacity in their
signatures); see also Anderson v. Gardner, 647 P.2d 3, 4-5 (Utah 1982) (where it is
ambiguous whether a corporate officer signed a contract in a representative capacity, he
is personally liable); Starley v. Deseret Foods Corp., 93 Utah 577, 74 P.2d 1221, 1223-25
(1938) (corporate secretary who signed corporate promissory note without adding word
"secretary" next to signature was personally liable on note).
These cases are analogous to the facts at bar assuming arguendo that Mr. Weston
did intend to act solely on behalf of May Corporation. Mr. Weston is personally liable
for the Preferred Credit Line debt because he never once expressly manifested any intent
to act on behalf of May Corporation relative to the advances he took against the Preferred
Credit Line.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT MR. WESTON WAS
PERSONALLY OBLIGATED TO REPAY THE PREFERRED CREDIT LINE
DEBT PURSUANT TO THE JANUARY 21, 2000 COMMERCIAL GUARANTY.
The January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty signed by Mr. Weston and attached

as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Helen M. Rozich clearly and unambiguously guaranteed
"any and all of [May Corporation's] obligations, debts, and indebtedness to [Key Bank]
now existing or hereinafter incurred or created . . . ." R. 172-74. This Guaranty was
legally enforceable and remained in full force and effect throughout the duration of Key
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Bank's extension of the Preferred Credit Line and through Mr. Weston's default
thereunder. See generally Cessna Finance Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1978)
(continuing guaranty enforceable). The enforceability and sufficiency of the January 21,
2000 Continuing Guaranty was not an issue raised below, and is therefore not at issue in
this appeal. The only issue raised below and at issue on appeal is whether the January 21,
2000 Commercial Guaranty was abrogated by Key Bank and Mr. Weston.

The

undisputed facts evidence that the Guaranty was never abrogated. Therefore, it remained
enforceable against Mr. Weston, and Mr. Weston is answerable at law to Key Bank for
any and all debt incurred by May Corporation and owed to Key Bank.
In his Memorandum in Opposition to Key Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Mr. Weston alleged that the January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty had been abrogated
by a subsequent transaction and settlement. R. 300-01. Mr. Weston alleged that the
purported abrogation was evidenced by subsequent transactional documentation,
guaranties and a Stipulation included with the Affidavit of Wayne Weston and attached
as Exhibit "B" to his Memorandum in Opposition. See R. 260-284. However, even a
limited review the transactional documents, guaranties, and draft settlement documents
included with Mr. Weston's Affidavit reveals that these documents undisputedly pertain
to a completely separate and unrelated transaction. They have nothing to do with the
January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty.
First, the documents referenced by Mr. Weston and included with his Affidavit
made no reference whatsoever to the January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty.

Id.

Second, the draft Stipulation and Settlement Agreement included with these documents
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specifically and expressly identified which promissory notes and commercial guarantees
were at issue and were to be abrogated by the proposed Settlement Agreement. R. 267.
Pursuant to the terms of the draft Settlement Agreement, the only Commercial
Guarantees to be abrogated in the settlement were the July 30, 2003 Commercial
Guarantees signed by Mary Beth Weston and May Corporation, respectively. Id. Mr.
Weston is fully aware that there has never been any credible or legitimate evidence that
the January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty was abrogated. Mr. Weston's persistence in
maintaining this clearly erroneous argument where there is clearly no evidence to support
the same is highly suspect and only confuses the straightforward facts and issues.
Because the January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty was never abrogated, it
remained in effect and enforceable against Mr. Weston, personally. Thus, accepting as
true Mr. Weston's repeated contention and argument that the Preferred Credit Line was a
contract between Key Bank and May Corporation, Mr. Weston undisputedly remained
liable thereon pursuant to the January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty.
Summary judgment may be affirmed 'on any ground available to the trial court,
even if it is one not relied on below." Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235
(Utah 1993). Thus, even if the district court did not rely on this ground, the Court of
Appeals may affirm on this ground and indeed should do so in this case. Moreover, if
summary judgment is affirmed on this ground, this Court's review of the district court's
denial of Mr. Weston's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Helen M. Rozich is moot as the
Affidavit of Helen M. Rozich is unnecessary to establish this claim. Furthermore, if
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affirmed on this ground, Key Bank is contractually entitled to recover its attorney's fees
and costs pursuant to the terms of the January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED MR. WESTON'S MOTION TO
STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF HELEN M. ROZICH.
On appeal, Mr. Weston reiterates his argument that the Affidavit of Helen M.

Rozich should have been stricken for a purported lack of foundation and because it
contained inadmissible hearsay.

Brief of Appellant, p. 25-27'.

Key Bank in turn,

reiterates its argument that this issue was not properly presented to the district court and
therefore not preserved for appeal as Mr. Weston failed to set forth any argument or
authority in the district court proceeding upon which he based his Motion to Strike. R.
353-54. In addition to identifying Mr. Weston's failure to properly preserve and present
this issue, Key Bank pointed out in its Memorandum in Opposition to Mr. Weston's
Motion to Strike that an adequate foundation was laid for the affidavit testimony of Ms.
Rozich and that her testimony was admissible pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 803(6).
The documents relied upon by Ms. Rozich in preparation of her Affidavit were
clearly identified as documents kept by Key Bank in its ordinary course of business and
previously produced to Mr. Weston during fact discovery. R. 355-56. In his Brief, Mr.
Weston later conceded that these documents were indeed produced and identified by Key
Bank. Brief of Appellant, p. 25. Furthermore, these documents consisted of hundreds of
pages and included, but were not limited to invoice statements, cashed checks, and
computer-generated account status information sheets. Id., see also R. 178-80. Given the
sheer volume of the documents and files reviewed by Ms. Rozich, not all of them were
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reproduced as exhibits to her Affidavit. Mr. Weston has cited to any authority for the
proposition that Ms. Rozich was compelled to produce all documents upon which she
relied within, or together with, her affidavit.
Ms. Rozich's review of those Key Bank files and documents identified and
discussed above provided her with an ample foundation upon which she based her
affidavit testimony. R. 182-4. In her affidavit, Ms. Rozich laid the proper foundation for
the admission of her affidavit testimony and by predicating her testimony on her position
with Key Bank, Key Bank's course of business dealings, and upon her review of Key
Bank's file documentation. Id. Ms. Rozich testified that she personally reviewed these
documents, and that her inspection of the same was ordinary by virtue of her
responsibilities as a collections officer for Key Bank. Id. Ms. Rozich was qualified in
every respect to lay the foundation for the admission of the documents at issue and her
testimony on behalf of Key Bank. Mr. Weston offered nothing to dispute this. R. 315,
353-56.
Moreover, much of the affidavit testimony offered by Ms. Rozich was conceded as
undisputed fact by Mr. Weston during his deposition. For example, Mr. Weston himself
conceded in his deposition that he had contacted Key Bank and solicited the Preferred
Credit Line in or around 2000. R. 211-13. This comports with Key Bank's invoicing and
computer records which show the Preferred Credit Line was opened in 2000 as averred
by Ms. Rozich. R. 182-84. Furthermore, the documents previously produced by Key
Bank, i.e., cashed checks, invoices, and computer generated account status information
sheets, all undisputedly establish that the Preferred Credit Line was opened and the first
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advance taken by Mr. Weston in 2000. R. 168-72. As a representative for Key Bank, it
is not necessary for Ms. Rozich to have been the actual person who conducted the
telephone call through which Mr. Weston established his Preferred Credit Line. By
virtue of her knowledge of the parameters of the personal Preferred Credit Line program
and her thorough review of Mr. Weston's information from within the Key Bank file
documents relating to the Preferred Credit Line, Ms. Rozich could adequately determine,
and therefore testify that Mr. Weston provided his personal information in connection
with his application for the Preferred Credit Line. R. 182-84. The district court properly
held that the Affidavit of Helen M. Rozich was based upon adequate foundation. This
Court should affirm that ruling.
Mr. Weston does not dispute that the foregoing Key Bank records and documents
were in fact, kept in Key Bank's ordinary course of business as outlined in Utah R. Evid.
803(6). Brief of Appellant, p. 26-27. Furthermore, Mr. Weston offered no evidence or
argument to refute Key Bank's averment that the documents produced during discovery
and relied upon by Ms. Rozich were kept in Key Bank's ordinary course of business per
the requirements of Utah R. Evid. 803(6). Id. For this reason, this Court should affirm
the district court's ruling that the documents and related testimony set forth in the
Affidavit of Helen M. Rozich fell within the business exception to the hearsay rule and in
turn, affirm the denial of Mr. Weston's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Helen M.
Rozich.
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IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS TO KEY BANK PURSUANT TO THE PREFERRED CREDIT LINE
AGREEMENT, OR ALTERNATIVELY PURSUANT TO THE JANUARY 21,
2000 COMMERCIAL GUARANTY.
The district court correctly awarded attorney's fees and costs to Key Bank

following the court's grant of summary judgment. The district court plainly disclosed its
basis for the award of attorney's fees and costs as both the Preferred Credit Line
Agreement and in the alternative, the January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty. R. 399401. Because the undisputed facts evidence that Mr. Weston personally entered into the
Preferred Credit Line Agreement with Key Bank, he is personally liable to Key Bank for
all reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in collecting his deficient account
pursuant to the terms of the Preferred Credit Line Agreement. R. 189-90.
In the alternative, in the event that this Court agrees with Mr. Weston's contention
that the Preferred Credit Line formed a contract solely between May Corporation and
Key Bank, Mr. Weston is nonetheless liable to repay the debt pursuant to the January 21,
2000 Commercial Guaranty as the Guaranty was never abrogated. R. 172-74. Under
either the Preferred Credit Agreement or Guaranty, Mr. Weston is personally liable for all
of Key Bank's reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the district court action and on
appeal. Accordingly, the district court's award of attorney's fees and costs to Key Bank
should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Key Bank agrees with Mr. Weston on one thing, this was not a close case. Key
Bank was entitled to summary judgment for a variety of reasons.
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The district court correctly held that the material facts were undisputed and
sufficiently evidenced that Mr. Weston was personally obligated on the Preferred Credit
Line as a matter of law. Mr. Weston's self-serving but often self-contradicting testimony
could not muddy the water enough to create any genuine issues of material fact. The
district court correctly found that Mr. Weston personally took advantage of the line of
credit and personally obtained the funds from the Preferred Credit Line.

The

convenience and counter checks signed personally and individually by Mr. Weston and
then paid into his various business and personal accounts are enough. Mr. Weston's
personal use of the Preferred Credit Line funds is also clearly substantiated by the invoice
statements and corroborating bank documents. The issues of personal versus business
address and social security number were rightfully treated by the district court as red
herrings.
The district court's summary judgment in favor of Key Bank should also be
affirmed because the district court correctly held that Mr. Weston failed to provide any
evidence to demonstrate that the January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty had been
abrogated. Even if Key Bank were to concede the first issue on appeal, Mr. Weston
would nonetheless be personally liable for the debt based upon Mr. Weston's admission
that the Preferred Credit Line debt was incurred by May Corporation and operation of the
January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty.
The district court's denial of Mr. Weston's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Helen
M. Rozich should be also affirmed because the district court correctly held that the
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subject affidavit contained sufficient foundation and fell within the admissibility
requirement of Utah R. Evid. 803(6).
Finally, the district court's award of attorney's fees and costs should be affirmed
because the district court correctly held that an award of attorney's fees and costs was
warranted by operation of the Preferred Credit Line Agreement or alternatively under the
January 21, 2000 Commercial Guaranty.
Accordingly, Key Bank respectfully requests that the district court's order
granting Key Bank summary judgment and order denying Mr. Weston's Motion to Strike
the Affidavit of Helen M. Rozich both be affirmed with reasonable attorney's fees and
costs awarded to Key Bank on appeal.
DATED this y

day of January, 2009.

ARNOLD RICHER /
RICHER & OVERHOlT, P.C.
Attorneys for Key Bank National Association
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